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Background: To achieve the ambition of the energy transition in the built environment, Dutch local governments
try to motivate citizens to participate as communities in policy processes. There is a general expectation that such
an interactive approach will foster a more rational policy output and will create stronger support from citizens
towards policy outcomes. The emphasis put on this output-outcome effectiveness should not eclipse another major
criterion of government policy- and decision-making and implementation: the legitimacy of political authority.
Major building blocks of such legitimacy are the principles of liberal democracy and of the rule of law. The aim
of this contribution is to identify safeguards for a legitimate exercise of political authority in interactive regional
governance initiatives.
Methods: The empirical data about ‘Sustainable Community Overijssel’ is gathered by document study, including
research reports, policy plans, and project documents, and by studying recent publications and news items. The
analysis uses Beetham’s multidimensional approach of legitimacy as point of departure.
Results: Beetham’s legitimacy dimensions are elaborated upon from a liberal democracy viewpoint and a
regulatory state pragmatic choice between various institutional environments. From this, legitimacy dimensions of
‘shared values’ and ‘consent’ emerge as most sensitive to interactive policy-making, necessitating proper safeguards,
safeguards with relevance to the legitimacy of initiatives such as Sustainable Community Overijssel.
Conclusions: Legitimacy is never a given standard, it may be designed into structures and ambitions, but it will still
need to be achieved by proper practice. This is certainly the case in projects concerning sustainability challenges of
which effective solutions are by no means clear and readily deployable. The Overijssel case should be seen as one
of many interesting cases towards evidence-based effective and legitimate policy practices.
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Ever since the publication of the ‘Fourth National Envir-
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used in the Netherlands to refer to the interventions by
government, possibly together with private partners, to
become less dependent on fossil energy and accomplish
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in any medium, provided the original work is pFrom the outset, the formulation of long-term policy
plans to realize a sustainable and efficient energy supply
system was by no means an exclusive responsibility of
governmental departments. In achieving a successful cli-
mate and energy policy, the Dutch government attached
great importance to the contribution of private partners
from the policy field [2]. This choice is in keeping with
what is called, especially within public administration,
the shift from government to governance [3]. This shift
comes with increased interaction between public and
private actors [4]. In realizing the energy transition in
the Netherlands, central government also depends on
the contribution of decentralized authorities, such asan open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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of (for profit) businesses and (not for profit) interest
groups. The idea is that their active involvement leads to
the input of capital, technical expertise, entrepreneur-
ship, and (social) support in the policy process [5]. This
involvement can take many forms, ranging from public-
private partnerships to interactive governance [5].
The Dutch province of Overijssel also considers the
energy transition as its responsibility. In the program
‘Energy pact Overijssel,’ the province has presented its
policy ambitions in the areas of climate and energy
[6]. At first, this provincial policy was in tune with the
European and national policy in the battle against cli-
mate change: a 30% CO2 reduction in 2020 below 1990
levels [6]. Later, this policy goal was changed. The prov-
ince committed itself to the effort of achieving the 30%
CO2 reduction as soon as 2017 [7]. According to the
province, there are opportunities to achieve this en-
hanced ambition by setting up, with great speed and effi-
ciency, sustainability projects throughout Overijssel [8].
One of the projects that are mainly focused on increas-
ing decentralized energy production is the initiative ‘Sus-
tainable Community Overijssel.’ In this project, the
province applies an interactive governance method to-
wards making villages and urban districts more sustain-
able [9]. We will elaborate on this method later.
In cases of interactive governance, ideally, citizens, pri-
vate organizations, and governors have the positive ex-
pectation that their joint effort will result in more
rational outcomes and that there will be greater support
by citizens of the decisions taken, especially in compari-
son with policy- and decision-making in an hierarchical-
unicentric setting [10]. The emphasis on such benefits is
most relevant to policy effectiveness, but it should not
eclipse another major criterion for policy- and decision-
making by government: the legitimacy of political au-
thority [11]. This contribution analyzes the legitimacy of
interactive governance. Its aim is to identify safeguards
for a legitimate exercise of political authority in inter-
active governance initiatives. We present the case of
Sustainable Community Overijssel as a backdrop to our
focus on more theoretical fundamental questions about
such safeguards. Consequently, the main purpose of the
description of the case is not to provide in-depth infor-
mation about Sustainable Community Overijssel itself.
The case is suitable as it provides a fine example of ‘on
the ground’ involvement of groups and communities of
citizens willing to invest in the collaborate exploration of
new avenues of sustainable action. As in many modern
states, the ‘quality criteria’ for political authority in the
Netherlands are closely linked to the concept of the lib-
eral state and, as such, with the concepts or principles of
democracy and of the rule of law, the latter being re-
ferred to as the Rechtsstaat [12]. As we will show laterin this contribution, the liberal state as a ‘democratic
rechtsstaat’ is not settled in stone and can be conceptu-
alized in various ways. Typically, these ways have varied
over time with shifts, from the nineteenth century min-
imal state, via the twentieth century welfare state, to the
twenty-first century regulatory state [13]. Our analysis
will show that these are not merely historic variations
but also ideal-type conceptualizations of the liberal state,
useful to an analysis and evaluation of legitimacy, as
in the case of political authority in the Sustainable
Community Overijssel project.
Methods
Our contribution is not of an empirical but rather of a
theoretical-analytical nature. As mentioned before, the
aim of our study is to identify relevant safeguards for a
legitimate exercise of political authority in initiatives
such as Sustainable Community Overijssel. In order to
meet this aim, we present an outline of the case. To that
end, empirical data is gathered by document study, in-
cluding research reports, policy plans, and project docu-
ments, and also by studying recent publications and
news items about the case. For the analytical approach,
the framework of David Beetham is used as a point of
departure in discussing the legitimacy of policy- and
decision-making. Beetham’s multidimensional approach
on legitimacy, as described below, provides a useful for-
mat to structure different aspects of legitimacy relevant
to our discussion about the match between public au-
thority and interactive policy-making.
An analytical framework for legitimacy
Legitimacy, of course, has been the focus of much atten-
tion in administrative-academic discourse. In turn, its
legal-administrative appraisal is closely connected with
the concepts of the Rechtsstaat or the Rule of Law and,
generally speaking, strongly associated with the image
of ‘government’ in a (sovereign) hierarchical-unicentric
setting [5]. The value of legitimacy builds upon public law
notions such as legality and the separation of powers,
democracy, human rights, and legal protection [5]. Under
the politico-legal doctrine of the liberal state, these
underpinnings call for a strict separation of spheres and
consequently in tasks, powers, and responsibilities be-
tween government and private parties. Consequently, the
government shall not identify itself with the private inter-
ests of specific individuals and shall operate (only or pri-
marily) on the basis of a democratic political mandate
(preferably on the basis of representation) to best ensure
its focus on the general/public interest [5].
In the case of interactive governance, both this strict
separation (public versus private) and this political man-
date (representative versus participative) seem problem-
atic. Therefore, we analyze whether and, if so, how
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such as Sustainable Community Overijssel, can fit in with
the legitimacy of hierarchical ‘decision-making by govern-
ment’ as (traditionally) prescribed (hierarchically) by public
law. This perspective is chosen given the premise, as
discussed above, that public authority has the effect that,
although perhaps resulting from an interactive process,
decisions taken are hierarchically (i.e., unilaterally) binding
for the relevant external actors (also known as ‘regulatees’).
David Beetham has developed a cross-discipline per-
spective on legitimacy that lends itself well to build a
connection between public administration and legal-
administrative boundary conditions for the legitimate
exercise of authority. He describes legitimacy as a ‘multi-
dimensional’ concept, with three dimensions: (1) legality,
(2) shared values, (3)consent [14]. Together they consti-
tute the (cumulative) conditions for legitimacy, which
can subsequently be tested empirically. Table 1 shows
Beetham’s own schematic interpretation of this.
Dimension 1, legality, calls for a legal validation of the
exercise of authority, as the ‘law stands’ - including un-
written rules [16]. Legal rules can support unilateral
government regulation, not in the least because the gov-
ernment is subordinate to the law (i.e., ‘rule of law’).
Dimension 2, shared values, is about the requirement
that the rules by which regulatees are bound are ‘intrinsic-
ally’ justified [17]. Such rules shall reflect the ‘normative
principles’ that express shared value perceptions about the
citizen-government relationship. Generally, justification fol-
lows upon acceptance of their origin (‘what is their source?’)
and/or their content (‘what norms do they hold?’).
Dimension 3, consent, refers to the demand of some
form of voluntary consent of the regulatee(s) with the
political exercise of power by the dominant actor, [18]
such as on the basis of democratic mechanisms.
Hierarchical-unicentric governance (i.e., government)
can be regarded as legitimate if and when the exercise of
political or, in more legal terms, public authority takes
place by virtue of and within the limits of the law (‘legal-
ity’), when these requirements of lawfulness are in keep-
ing with social perceptions (‘shared values,’ e.g., about
distributive justice or proper public administration - as
manifested in shifts from the minimal/night-watchman
state, to the positive/welfare state, and to the, present,Table 1 The three dimensions of legitimacy according to
Beetham (Table 1.1 in [15])
Criteria of legitimacy Form of non-legitimate power
1 Conformity to rules (legal validity) Illegitimacy (breach of rules)
2 Justifiability of rules in
terms of shared beliefs
Legitimacy deficit (discrepancy
between rules and supporting
beliefs, absence of shared beliefs)
3 Legitimation through
expressed consent
Delegitimation (withdrawal
of consent)regulatory state) [13] and when the government inter-
vention is based on the (democratic) consent of citizens
(‘consent,’ e.g., elections/representation, referenda, public
participation) [5].
This appraisal of legitimacy concerns all three dimen-
sions of legitimacy relating to just one particular type of
public governance of societal interests, that of hierarchy
by government. We name such type an ‘institutional
environment’ as its mode of governance crystallizes em-
pirically and normatively into a particular ideal-type
interaction pattern. Hierarchy by government presents
us with a top-down pattern of human interaction, which
builds on the mechanism of ‘command and control’ of
government against citizens. Alternatively, market, as an
interaction pattern that builds on the mechanism of
competition and exchange, and network, as the inter-
action pattern that shaped by the mechanism of cooper-
ation and inclusion, are institutional environments with
ideal-type patterns of behavior concerning societal gov-
ernance, also carrying both an empirical and a normative
side to them [19]. With each issue of societal interest,
such as (promoting) sustainable energy, an analysis can be
made both empirically (what types with relevance to the
interest at hand are in place and how they are perform-
ing?) and normatively (what criteria of general acceptance
and justice are relevant to fostering and safeguarding this
interest in terms of patterns of distribution of rights,
wealth, and powers and as regards proper role play of in-
volved actors?).
As to the normative aspect, the above appraisal re-
garding hierarchy may be summarized as statutory allo-
cation of power and checks and balances. Similarly, we
may summarize the normative aspect of markets as
fair competition and consumer protection, and social
enterprise facilitation as regards networks. The fact
that Beetham's legitimacy focus is on political authority,
which is most clearly present in the hierarchical environ-
ment, does not rule out the possibility of also elaborating
(schematically; Table 2) on his ‘3D analysis’ to legitimacy
of public governance through the institutional environ-
ments of markets and networks.
Together, the empirical and normative appraisals may
provide a basis for assessing, in terms of possible market,
network, or government failures, the public governance
performance in terms of securing and fostering the con-
cerned societal interest - or, for that matter, the assess-
ment that one environment or mechanism holds more
promise than others in being effective and legitimate in
service of, for instance, (promoting) sustainable energy
(production and use). In making this assessment, gener-
ally liberal states by default regard markets or civil soci-
ety networks to be the most suitable environments in
securing and promoting societal interests, as this fits
best with the ideal of personal freedom. Consequently,
Table 2 Legitimacy dimensions across institutional environments
Legitimacy
dimension
Type of environment
Government hierarchy Market Network
Legality (focus) Rechtsstaat/rule of law explicit legal powers Fair competition and consumer
protection; contract law
Freedom of association
Shared beliefs (main) Public service in the liberal state Private interest by efficient and
consensual transactions
Common interest towards
converging strategies
Consent (core concept) Voice: representative and participatory democracy Exit: exchanges in a
competitive environment
Loyalty: voluntary cooperation
by (com)pact
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native, if and in as much as markets and networks fail.
As to hierarchy, the above legitimacy appraisal also
holds a reference to ‘shifts from the minimal/night-
watchman state, to the positive/welfare state, and to the,
present, regulatory state.’ These are politico-legal con-
ceptualizations of the liberal state as mentioned above
(also known as liberal democracy under the rule of law),
which builds on the notion of autonomous private liber-
ties and a clear divide between the public and the private
realms, i.e., between state and society. The conceptuali-
zations focus on the tasks that are considered the
core responsibility of government and desired type of
interaction between government and the society and
the accompanying ‘equilibrium’ between the public and
the private realm from a governance perspective. Each
conceptualization holds a particular politico-legal per-
spective on good public governance, fitting with the
overall liberal state doctrine, and with the aim of provid-
ing long-term societal stability [20]a. As such, we need
to consider that these models not only express shared
beliefs or values concerning the place of government but
inescapably also relate to the relevance of markets and
networks in a public governance perspective.
In the minimal or night-watchman state model, gov-
ernment only safeguards societal interests of peace, safety,
and security, so that private freedom and equality are se-
cured and may flourish in markets and in networks. The
welfare state model places government in a more active
position, securing and fostering citizens' freedom and
equality, as matters of societal interests not only in terms
of formal rights but also in wealth - and markets and net-
works must adjust and supplement. Finally, in the regula-
tory state model, eclecticism and remediableness rule the
choice of proper institutional setting to secure and foster
societal interests - with government generally taking a
more ‘meta-public’ position [13,21,22]b.
Although we prefer an analytical understanding of
these conceptualizations, we can also frame a historical
narrative. From the wake of the liberal state (with the
American and French revolutions), we see how, from
societal interest governance primacy of markets and
networks (in the minimal state - end of the eighteenth
until end of the nineteenth century), there is a shift viaprimacy of government (in the welfare state - end of the
nineteenth until end of the twentieth century) to the
absence of any primacy (not even of networks - if even
these could carry such primacy) and ‘remediableness’
(in the regulatory state - end of the twentieth century
until today). We have to recognize, however, that the
three conceptualizations are presently active in an over-
lapping or intertwined way. In some matters, govern-
ment still provides the typical minimal state safeguards
(as regards peace, safety, and security) and has a primacy
over safeguarding a minimal and equal share in wealth
(as regards social security). At the same time, govern-
ment seeks to empower actors within markets and civil
networks and improve the workings of these environ-
ments (e.g., consumer protection in markets) and may
also enter into contracts and collaborations with market
and network parties involved (e.g., PPP), securing or fos-
tering societal interests (as regards not only sustainable
energy projects but also infrastructure, public transport,
health, environment, and culture).
In saying that government is taking a more meta-
public position in the regulatory state, we purport that
government still holds a position with an overall or sys-
temic public governance responsibility. There are three
important aspects to such a remark.
Firstly, government is less an actor that is expected to
row, as in itself performing operational activities in pro-
viding public service, and more an actor that chooses to
steer [23], especially by regulation, the workings of mar-
kets and networks and activities of actors involved, so as
to secure legitimate and effective governance, proper
to societal interests. Thus, government will more often
limit its involvement to an (hierarchical) identification of
a public interest in terms of a regulatory definition of
relevant objectives (i.e., ‘steering’) and leave the actual
execution of public services to private parties in markets
and networks (i.e., ‘rowing’ - as by the delivery of goods
and services). In practice, as the history of privatization
shows, there is often an iteration between identification
and execution, with changing and intertwined roles,
whereby private actors may also have a say in identifica-
tion (as in co-regulation) [24], while conversely govern-
ment may still take all or at least some control in the
implementation.
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although our image of the regulatory state may suggest
otherwise, in this era of governance, government can no
longer act as an ‘unmoved mover’ deciding on fitness of
a particular institutional environment in the service of
specific societal interests. It may still have a systemic re-
sponsibility to influence the choice of ‘arena,’ but it will
mostly have to do so in an interactive way. This certainly
applies to the fact that under multilevel governance,
we witness a ‘decentring of the state’ (also referred to as
the ‘new or post-regulatory state’) as private and inter-,
supra-, and transnational regulations play an increasingly
more important role in public policy-making [24].
Finally, government steering may either be about mat-
ters of actual public interests (e.g., safety, social security,
energy) or matters of meta-public interest (i.e., improv-
ing the workings of markets, civil networks, and govern-
ments as such) [25]c. Given both the difference in nature
and in discretion of powers involved, government inter-
ventions need to be clear on whether addressing a spe-
cific failure or possible improvement in service to a
particular actual public interest (e.g., electricity reliabil-
ity) or a meta-public concern (e.g., fair competition).
This is especially important in view of private party
certainty (whether businesses or non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs)) about their operational scope of
opportunities and risks.
As our contribution is about the relation between pub-
lic authority and interactive policy-making, somehow
the above dimensions of legitimacy of public authority
need to be matched with the essential characteristics of
interactive policy-making, without infringing upon them.
Based on this, the notion of coupling different institu-
tional environments may be of relevance. If and how this
is feasible will be discussed below.
Results and discussion
Before entering in this feasibility discussion, we want to
first present an outline of the policy choices that were
made in the Sustainable Community Overijssel project.
Next, we will consider its interactive policy approach in
terms of possible legitimacy critiques on two separate
issues of interactiveness: ‘the public (i.e., government)
influencing the private (i.e., free societal discourse)’ and
‘the private (i.e., a private jury) influencing the public
(i.e., taking administrative decisions).’ In the final ana-
lysis, we will place these critiques and issues in the context
of Beetham’s legitimacy dimensions, especially shared
values and consent, as these reflect relevant politico-legal
orientations, as we already saw in different conceptualiza-
tions of the liberal state. Subsequently, we will present a
critical - but constructive - analysis of the design of legit-
imacy in projects such as that of Overijssel's sustainable
communities.The case of Sustainable Community Overijssel
In 2010 and 2011, the province of Overijssel organized a
contest, which was called Sustainable Community Overijs-
sel. The citizens were challenged by the province to formu-
late plans for a sustainable local environment with a focus
on sustainable energy production [9]. The communities that
participated in the contest aimed at becoming eligible for
financial support (in different amounts, varying from 50,000
euros to 1.5 million euros) by the province, to accomplish
their ambitions and have a chance at winning the title of
‘the most sustainable community in Overijssel’ [26,27].
To make Sustainable Community Overijssel a success,
the province applied an interactive governance approach.
The starting point was that inhabitants of local commu-
nities, such as villages and urban areas, would identify
their own societal problems within the areas of climate
and energy and formulate their own policy solutions to
them [9]. The objective behind this approach was to over-
come the ‘wicked problem’ of climate change by focusing
on a limited number of coherent, well-supported, and
(thus) manageable local policy issues and solutions [9,27].
During the contest, the inhabitants of villages and dis-
tricts had to show what efforts they already made on
sustainable development. Furthermore, they had to ex-
plain their concrete plans towards becoming a model
sustainable community [9]. These plans were presented
in the so-called bid books. The ideas of the communities
had to relate to the themes of (1) energy, (2) mobility,
(3) water, (4) food, and/or (5) waste [28]. The groups of
citizens or communities that wanted to submit a plan
also had to explain how they would strike a balance be-
tween the dimensions of people, planet, and profit [28].
Within these boundaries, the participants had room to
formulate their own ideas [9]. The project approach re-
sulted in many submissions, ranging from installing
solar panels on a community center to the introduction
of an electric ‘community car.’
Prior to the contest, the province constituted a ‘jury of
experts,’ including an ex-politician (the chairman of the
jury), an ex-astronaut/professor of sustainable technol-
ogy, and two directors of related interest groups [26,29].
It was this jury’s task to determine which community
would be the winner of the contest and would thus qual-
ify for a provincial subsidy. In taking a decision with
the latter consequences, clearly the legitimacy issue is at
stake - if only when we consider Beetham’s emphasis,
concerning the dimension of consent, on democratic
mechanisms as a basis of the exercise of political author-
ity [11]. In the Sustainable Community Overijssel case, it
is not a public agency under democratic control that de-
cides on the use of public funds, but it is a private com-
mittee that decides ‘who gets what.’ In terms of the
ultimate impact of subsidizing, there are also other legit-
imacy concerns, especially relating to the dimension of
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actively’ exerts influence on public discourse.
Possible legitimacy criticism regarding interactive energy
transition policy
The interactive governance approach presented above
builds upon private involvement and commitment, not
only on the ground in the plans that communities for-
mulate and to which they commit themselves but also in
the allocation of public benefits (i.e., subsidies) to facili-
tate the execution of such plans.
The private initiative on the ground may be considered
a voluntary matter, but the fact that it is a ‘bid’ and thus
extends to the possibility of public means being used to
support one and not all private initiatives more than
suggests a regulatory government effort towards behav-
ioral change. This element of orchestrated or ‘public-pri-
vate voluntarism’ begs the question of the legitimacy of
government organizing and facilitating such support. The
fact that the decision about allocation of public means
towards such support is left to a private committee (of ex-
perts, of sorts) brings in the second element of ‘private-
public administration,’ which calls for reflection upon the
legitimacy of the binding consequences this brings.
In a provocative stance, it could be said that the issue
of public-private voluntarism raises the question if gov-
ernment is in fact propagating a political agenda under
the cover of spontaneous private initiative, thus infrin-
ging on society’s free communicative action or discourse,
and if so, by what mandate? Similarly, the issue of
private-public administration raises concerns on whether
and, if so, how the publicness of government, as a matter
of its actions and their effects being solely for the pur-
pose of the public good (in accordance with the afore-
mentioned principle of non-identification and effective
public service), is safeguarded against a scenario where
the aforementioned committee places its members’ pri-
vate interests before the public interests involved.
Such a critical approach poses a total opposite to a
possible positive appraisal of the Overijssel case, empha-
sizing that any mode of policy-making has democratic
backing, by the representations involved (i.e., the provin-
cial council), that breathes public participation both in
shaping initiatives (on the ground) and in deciding on
their financial support (by a private committee of ex-
perts), simply cannot be bad or at least is intrinsically
better than a ‘mere’ top-down (if not command and con-
trol) policy execution.
If we regard both these legitimacy issues, as exempli-
fied in the Sustainable Community Overijssel initiative,
from the viewpoint of traditional government activity,
given that the government is basically hierarchically in-
volved as a provider of subsidies, then our analysis (and
possible evaluation) should focus on principles of liberaldemocracy and of the rule of law. These can be framed
in terms of Beetham’s three dimensions of legitimacy
and, subsequently, as a mere example, compared with
the setup of the Overijssel case. We should be careful,
however, to not only regard the initiative merely as a
matter of traditional public authority but to also under-
stand its significance in the shift from government to
governance [3] and how this challenges the typical lib-
eral state public-private divide and views on the role of
the state and that of government - especially as a matter
of shared values and consent.
Before going into this, however, let us first voice some
of the possible legitimacy critiques concerning both
public-private voluntarism and private-public adminis-
tration, so as to more clearly set the stage for debate and
then present a perspective on how legitimacy of govern-
ance (of sustainability) may be designed, especially in
our case in point.
Legitimacy critiques regarding public-private voluntarism
This on the ground issue evokes several critiques, which
could be broadly alluded to as a matter of public govern-
ance morality and which relate especially to Beetham’s di-
mensions of shared values (e.g., private freedoms and the
non-identification principle) and consent (e.g., free debate
and equal political participation rights). To name but a
few critiques may suffice to frame this legitimacy issue.
Firstly, one may pose a Habermasian critique concern-
ing the influence that government exercises over free
communicative action within the society [30]. Is the
community contest in fact a system by which govern-
ment actively structures societal debate and private ini-
tiative, thereby favoring and facilitating some strands of
political thought above others?
Secondly, a critique in line with Foucault’s concept of
‘governmentality’ draws our attention to the acceptability
of government - both by state and by non-state institu-
tions and disciplines - involved in ‘conduct of conduct,’
as rational efforts of regulating private conduct towards
specific political objectives, by determining what counts as
truth and propagating accompanying knowledge through
society, thereby molding citizenship to suit particular pol-
itical ends [31].
Thirdly, the critique against the ‘libertarian paternalism’
following the currently popular ‘nudging’ approach to
regulation, coined by Thaler and Sunstein [32], comes to
mind. Supposedly combining libertarianism (i.e., people
are free to do and choose what they like) with paternalistic
intervention (i.e., legitimately influence people’s behavior
‘to make their lives longer, healthier, and better’) [32], regu-
latory interventions are presented in a way that nudges in-
dividuals towards the desired behavior without essentially
limiting their freedom of choice. The critique holds that
libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron, whereby influence
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readily becomes a non-libertarian form of command and
control (as when, shy of prohibition, fossil fuel cars are
taxed beyond a reasonable price). Should we regard arran-
ging for a sustainable community contest, as a shrewd
architecture towards nudging communities (and the indi-
viduals in them) into a sustainable energy transition?
Nudging is typically applied to merit goods (and ser-
vices) [33], as in renewable energy, but also in health
(care and food) and education. The discourse on merit
goods, however, features economic regulation, such as
subsidies or, conversely, taxation of demerit goods (such
as non-renewable fuels). Clearly, nudging and social
regulation (often depicted by a ‘preach’ but also by
fostering community activities) may create the same
positive effect. In the Overijssel case, the strategies of
economic and social regulation are combined.
By analogy, critique voiced against forms of regulation
by code or architecture seems relevant [34]. Typical ex-
amples of this type of regulation, which influences be-
havior through the design of a technical functionality,
are a speed ramp or a device blocking the possibility of
copying a DVD. In the context of this contribution,
allowing for the possibility to connect ‘smart grids’ to
the main energy grid comes to mind. Code as regulation
can take influencing individual choices one step further
than nudging - to an actual loss of freedom of choice,
even without awareness of such loss. Regulative code
leaves the option of choice open, such as by a warning
that while browsing the Internet one is one click re-
moved from pornographic content or by a smart meter
which by default connects to green electricity, unless it
is otherwise instructed. In constitutive code, undesirable
types of behavior are ‘simply’ designed out, as by the
‘smart meter’ that will only connect to green electricity
[35]. In Brownsword's view, designing out creates an
amoral situation through the lack of awareness of what
is good and what is bad behavior or of a push in one or
the other direction (e.g., to only use green energy) and,
consequently, making the proper ‘choice’ of behavior
meaningless as actually there was no choice. Thus, he
states: ‘A fully techno-regulated community is no longer
an operative moral community’ [36].
As we list these possible critiques and identify fears of
public-private voluntarism as illegitimate intrusion, we
may also get a first glimpse of the possible remedies or
safeguards, which may ensure legitimacy of regulation -
whether this is of a social nature, command and control,
competition-based, or code [37]. The core issue of such
intrusion is that of a possible ‘degradation’ of citizens be-
coming policy tools and a ‘perversion’ of societal debate
through public authority infringement upon the ‘level
communicative playing field,’ due to government support
of certain types of civil or community action. This touchesespecially on Beetham’s dimensions of shared values and
consent. With respect to shared values, clearly, the public-
private, state versus society divide characteristic of the lib-
eral state (i.e., liberal democracy) may be at stake. The
concept of public-private voluntarism raises concerns es-
pecially from the perspective of society and its individual
private members. These individuals should be regarded
as freed [38] and so equally may enjoy autonomous rights
(i.e., not given by the state and to be respected equally by
the state) and may become challenged by interactive pol-
icies, which include and support only those who act in
concert with government (or state) views. Thus, the main
threat lies with (perversely?) influencing free or open soci-
etal discourse. As regards consent, the closely connected
yet separate concern lies with the danger of exclusion
from societal discourse following social exclusion from
(benefits of) interactive policy-making, considering how
state democracy rests upon the capacity within society to
have all its individual members (able to) participate in
public debate. At face value, the primary vital substantive
remedies to this are transparency, making citizens know
what interventions are deployed to influence their behav-
ior; respect, allowing room for choice in as much as pos-
sible, so people can make their own moral choice; and
inclusion, keeping those who do not voluntarily participate
in interaction informed and if possible getting them in-
volved [39]. We will return to possible remedies later, after
having considered the critiques concerning private-public
administration.
Legitimacy critiques regarding private-public
administration
As to the public authority issue or the mandate of a pri-
vate committee taking decisions under public law, the
main ‘dimension of shared values’ critique again lies with
the aforementioned characteristics of the liberal state
but now with an emphasis on concerns from the per-
spective of the state and its individual citizens (as against
society and private persons mentioned above). The prim-
ordial worry lies with the principle of non-identification
(i.e., the government shall not act with the mere intention
to foster private interests (or neglect those of only some)
and with concern for the limits (in public focus and neces-
sity) of government powers. This allocation of powers and
determination of purpose relates to the ‘dimension of
consent,’ as it must ultimately rest with the ‘demos’ of citi-
zens who may equally participate in political debate and
subsequent decision-making - positioning political sover-
eignty (or imperium) well away from economic sovereignty
(or dominium) by avoiding any merger between private
and public property as under royal (and even enlightened)
despotism.
The element of publicness of any government purpose
or undertaking expresses that government service is
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regulation to subsidize green energy use is not intended
to personally benefit individuals who use this type of en-
ergy, but to foster the use of this energy type by support-
ing members of the class of people willing to engage
themselves or invest. In other words, government shall
not provide personal favors and most certainly not to
those running it.
Of course, running government is in itself the work of
many private persons, but in the service of government,
they are expected to operate as public representatives,
public appointees, or public servants - acting in the pub-
lic interest. The concept of the public interest should be
well distinguished from the realm of private interests,
the latter being either of a most individual nature (e.g.,
personal sentiments) or of a societal nature (i.e., shared
by many, such as in proper energy services). Clearly,
safeguarding societal interests is a concern to society as
a whole. If the government concludes that societal inter-
ests are not adequately realized because markets and
networks fail as suitable environments for the delivery of
suitable goods or services, it may postulate a public
interest under which it can be equipped with proper
powers and take appropriate measures to safeguard
and/or foster the underlying societal interest. These
measures may only be of intended service to this societal
interest as a public interest - so without (sole or select-
ive) identification with private interests. In keeping with
what was remarked earlier, it is generally regarded most
in keeping with the liberal state doctrine if such a course
of action is pursued only as an alternative, i.e., in case of
failure by markets and networks - and that upon identi-
fication of a particular public interest, the government
will first seek to involve markets or networks in the exe-
cution of the policy it has set out.
Then again, we should stress that under the liberal
state doctrine, the mere fact of a government being
endowed with the legal powers to pursue a particular
public interest, with regulatory effect upon private free-
doms and property rights, does by no means preclude
private persons from taking their own actions on the
same behalf. As private persons (not citizens) they may
still, acting within markets or networks, make their
own effort to foster or protect a societal interest (and re-
lated service, e.g., renewable energy) - even though this
has become an object of public interest. There is no
principle of non-identification that can be held against
private individuals (other than when they act as govern-
ment or as civil servants). In as much as public interest
regulation allows, it remains a freedom of private per-
sons to get involved as a matter of their private interest
(as in privately investing in solar panels) or as a matter
of privately felt concern for the involved societal interest
(as in NGOs or communities making a joint sacrifice forrenewable energy as they think this is the right thing to
do). In the Overijssel case, we witness that the private
initiatives involved, albeit ‘state incentivized,’ voluntarily
align with public interest policy-making, at least cer-
tainly those eligible for subsidy.
So, the critique concerning private-public administra-
tion by the use of a private committee acting as a public
jury essentially boils down to the risk of the private per-
sons involved ‘running off with the public interest’ - that
is, so as to favor either their own private interests or of
those private persons they favor, or to act with a bias
against those persons or groups that they privately
dislike. On a more subtle level, the critique relates to
general requirements of public office. These are the re-
quirements that structure government, such as by the
demand of proper checks and balances (e.g., oversight
and/or judicial review) and of structural openness and
transparency as well as the (legal) principles by which
government is run (i.e., of making, taking, and executing
decisions), such as impartiality, proper preparation, due
process, equality, proportionality, fairplay and integrity.
If so, how so can these requirements be met in the
Overijssel case? One may argue that, just as government
is run by private persons acting as public actors, perhaps
a similar position can be created with regard to the
members of the private committee that make up the jury
deciding on who gets a subsidy and who does not.
Clearly, the individuals involved are not hired to decide
upon private interest, but upon the capacities which are
considered most suitable to delivering the expert opin-
ion needed and which they hold (best). One may argue
that in fact their discretion is not of a (broad) political
nature, as the objectives of the program are generally
clear, and they only require the determination of what,
by comparison, is the most effective and efficient bid.
Elaborating on allocation of public rights
If, still on the issue of private-public administration, we
take this positive line of reasoning, we need to consider
first that the allocation of public rights, such as that of
subsidies, is an issue that allows for various approaches,
each having their own range of legitimate action. The re-
quirements for decision-making need to be in tune with
the criteria relevant to the exercise of the legal powers
involved, and these criteria primarily build on the type
and public purpose of the privately enjoyed public rights
involvede. Requirements also follow from the specific
type of public rights. There are many such types, but a
simple categorization presents four basic types: (a) pow-
ers (concerning the allocation of legal competences to
bindingly determine legal relations, generally powers of
government - clearly these are not relevant in terms of
private enjoyment); (b) liberties or immunities (such as
human rights, which can be privately enjoyed as within
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rights, against which government holds no power)f; [40]
(c) privileges (as privately enjoyed rights which purport a
regulatory exception or exemption to a general prohib-
ition or command, i.e., a permit or dispensation, as a
privilege to neglect a general public prohibition or com-
mand because in the particular private instance the gov-
ernment has no claim to enforce either the prohibition
or command); (d) claims (as a private claim to enjoy a
service or benefit against a duty of government to per-
form - as in subsidies, grants, and welfare benefits, free-
of-charge public services, and concessions).
Some of these public rights are of a personal character
(in personam) and cannot be transferred, let alone by
market transactions (as in the case of the Overijssel case
subsidies); others have a property character (in rem) and
can be transferred, possibly also on the market (as in the
case of CO2 allowances).
In many cases, the regulatory interest behind the allo-
cation of such rights (b, c, and d) does not reach beyond
the objective of orderly or proper operation. In many
permit systems, for example, the ‘prohibition unless per-
mitted’ rule only exists to organize a formal basis for
conditioning certain activities as regards, for instance,
their safety or fit with urban plans. Often, the allocation
of the relevant public right (e.g., a permit) is a matter of
equal treatment, against the backdrop of the ‘first-come,
first-served’ procedure. This may even be the case with
public rights concerning scarce resources, such as subsid-
ies from limited funds, permits for limited parking spaces,
or pollution space (as in allowances for emissions of CO2).
Scarcity, however, may also lead to using (economic) cri-
teria for best use of benefits or exemptions. Then the
principle of equality - through first-come, first-served - is
often exchanged for one of two (competition-based) sys-
tems: the expert judgment (aka the ‘beauty contest’) or the
market or price mechanism (aka ‘auctioning’).
Allocation by auctioning is especially apt for allocating
public rights when the ‘best use’ of these rights properly
translates in the most (static or dynamic) efficient use,
for which the highest bid is often considered the best in-
dicator (setting aside problems such as ‘winners curse’
[41]). Such bidding may be applied on auctioning for ini-
tial allocation (as a ‘primary market’) and/or for allowing
a ‘secondary market’ for trading public rights once these
have been allocated initially.
A ‘beauty contest’ is an interesting, alternative mech-
anism of allocating scarce public rights, especially when
best use cannot readily be translated in clear or one-
dimensional criteria, such as through an economic com-
parison between competing bids. Well-known examples
are subsidies in the area of arts and culture.
Clearly, the mechanism of the beauty contest, of which
the Overijssel case presents an example, stands awayfrom mechanisms where allocation of public rights (still)
requires a weighing against each other of different and
most likely incommensurable public interests (such as
between energy, environment, health, and safety) [42]. In
such case, a democracy-based political decision is gener-
ally called for (often preconditioned in general terms by
a policy guideline). Beauty contests and auctions are
concerned with (orderly, proper or best use of, or con-
cern for) a singular relevant public interest, in our case
that of sustainable energy, which nonetheless poses a
policy challenge as it is an ex ante ‘wicked’ and ‘ill-de-
fined’ problem. Major uncertainty about the best course
of action (in the Overijssel case also as to how citizens
can become effectively involved) exists when multiple
solutions and various solution paths present themselves
[43-45]. Adequate information, let alone a set of steps or
decision algorithm by which to choose the best course
of action, as with tame and/or well-defined problems, is
lacking. Consequently, substantive expertise, based on
context-specific or domain knowledge and knowledge-
based heuristics, is a primary concern, preferably to be
brought together in a multidisciplinary context of collab-
orative action - enhancing chances at success.
Given this concern, both the open invitation to enter
community bids, as well as the setup of a jury which em-
braces various disciplines for judging proposals, may be
regarded as a fitting beauty contest approach to organiz-
ing the necessary collaborative action both in terms of
creative thinking about possible projects and in terms of
proper selection and subsequent endorsement. As to
concerns over the equality principle, we should consider
that, apart from absolute exclusions (which qualify as dis-
crimination - as on race, gender, sexual inclination, and re-
ligion), this principle ‘merely’ calls for proper relative
criteria - relative to the purpose or objective of the scheme
and government power involved. In the Overijssel case,
this means that the private committee (bestowed with a
public task and power) shall not discriminate between
proposals or bids other than on the criteria, which are not
absolutely prohibited (as discriminatory) and which are
specifically relevant to enhancing sustainable community
projects. In other words, in principle, every group or com-
munity has a shot at launching a successful bid, and to
favor one bid above the other can only be legally justified
by reference to criteria relevant to the objective of the
scheme. In all other respects, bids should be regarded
equal. The latter also means that if bids are equal and one
is accepted, then the others need also be accepted.
The design of safeguards for a legitimate interactive
energy transition policy
From the above discussion, we can conclude that legitim-
acy issues are relevant especially as regards transparency,
respect, and inclusion, when we look at the public-private
Sanders et al. Energy, Sustainability and Society 2014, 4:4 Page 10 of 13
http://www.energsustainsoc.com/content/4/1/4voluntarism of on the ground influencing of opinion and
behavior and the requirements of proper structuring
of and due process in running government, as regards
private-public administration through private committee
decision-making. To secure legitimacy on these aspects,
Beetham’s dimensions of shared beliefs and consent are of
paramount importance.
The challenge of shared values
It should be clear that although the Overijssel case has
elements of social capacity building, which could be
understood as a meta-public objective, the project is not
(so much) about sustainability of communities as such,
but about the role of communities in protecting and in-
deed improving the sustainability of the environment -
as an actual public interest. Though citizens and private
communities involved in the Overijssel case may be as-
sumed to do so primarily as a matter of voluntarism,
even for them, it is important to know what they may
and may not expect from government in response to
their proposals - time too can be spent only once.
The province of Overijssel’s choice to call upon private
persons’ willingness to get involved in an actual public
interest (of environmental sustainability) seems to be
well in tune with the regulatory state concept of an
eclectic approach to policy definition and policy imple-
mentation. Upon identification by government of a par-
ticular public interest (in this case sustainability), private
actors (in the Overijssel case, civil networks) are facili-
tated to contribute both to further determination of this
objective and especially of formulating and implement-
ing actions towards these objectives. It is expected that
this contribution will serve both effectiveness and legit-
imacy of policies towards this objective. From our above
brief reference to ill-defined problems, we can under-
stand how organizing collaborative commitment and
creative thinking may be considered a necessary (if not
indispensible) step in the sustainability policy challenge.
On the one hand, this approach calls on the mechan-
ism of networking and particularly on (the capacity to
organize) civil networks. As such, it leaves the choice of
modus operandi within groups and communities to the
participants themselves. The participants remain private
persons, rather than that they become citizens (with
public responsibilities), which seems vital to the shared
liberal state value of a clear delineation between the
public and the private sphere. This touches on the need
for an open approach to the question of who to involve
in an initiative and who not to - as well as on equality
between and good faith of participants. It also includes
giving room to private persons’ substantive perspectives
on the issue. Ideally, these are primarily underpinned by
their collective private knowledge and skills, also at col-
laboration, but that is not to say that they will necessarilyalign with provincial public interest preferences - and as
such may trigger political debate.
The latter point is of course most relevant with respect
to decision-making with respect to the regulatory instru-
ment of the subsidy. Although of a hierarchical nature,
the fact that decision-making is left to experts at arm’s
length from government can be taken to (at least at-
tempt to) emphasize that government is not forcing its
views upon these networks. As private participants are
learning, so is the government.
The challenge of consent
So, we see that there is a regulatory state perspective
that may provide legitimacy as a matter of shared beliefs,
which accommodates the interactive policy initiative in
case. The same regulatory state approach may also pro-
vide a framework by which to address Beetham’s dimen-
sion of consent. In terms of institutional environments, it
could be argued that market consent rests primarily with
reciprocal ‘willingness to be bound’ (‘non-exit’ by con-
tract), as does network consent primarily with stakeholder
participation (‘loyalty’ by association) and government
hierarchy primarily by election (i.e., ‘voice,’ mediated by
representatives).
Along those lines, one could reason that in the min-
imal state, consent concerning service to societal inter-
ests is considered (again) primarily as an outcome of
a process of countless contractual market interactions
(including those that do not lead to contracts) or volun-
tary civil network interactions (including those initiatives
that do not lead to effective participative collaboration).
If an interest is not served, the free market has and/or
civil networks have spoken and we should not haste into
calling this ‘failure.’ In the welfare state, consent about
service to societal interests is primarily construed by a
general or public interest perspective, identified by those
who are elected to represent ‘the people’ (or at least
those most involved). Upon the hierarchical determin-
ation of a public interest need, market or network per-
formance may be judged as successful or a failure, and
if the latter applies, subsequent action may be taken.
Finally, under the eclectic regulatory state perspective,
there is no primacy of one or the other type of consent -
although an evaluation of success could start with asses-
sing if markets and networks are - by default - performing
successfully to a societal need. Consent becomes a matter
of proper design in which sometimes it is construed along
lines of markets, networks, or governments - across from
identification onto execution - but in other cases, consent
builds upon a joining of a hybrid plurality of elements
or mechanisms of creating consent. This could be in a
neat, two-stage complementary fashion, with identification
(i.e., determination of a public interest) being a matter
of hierarchical consent by representatives and execution
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ing a matter of contractual consent or stakeholder partici-
pation. However, when stages intertwine - as we explained
earlier in this contribution - it becomes more likely that
consent becomes a multifaceted joining of various mecha-
nisms at the same time: voice and/or loyalty and/or exit.
When energy policy objectives are set by government, we
may find that the government may hierarchically state its
position (as by or prior to government regulation), but in
all likelihood, in doing so, it will try and build upon stake-
holder consent, as through a gentlemen's agreement on
general policy objectives and main strategies [46]g. Simi-
larly, but on a more tactical level of play, the Overijssel
case combines hierarchical logic of consent, albeit through
private-public administration through experts with a strict
task, with network logic of consent. The latter is arranged
by an ‘open call,’ expressed by interested groups or com-
munities, in the stage of project initiative and, if supported
by the province, in the subsequent project implementation
phase. This of course means that the province, being the
initiator, must be clear, equally to when governments
privatize previously publicly rendered services, about the
scope of its own responsibilities and, with that, the condi-
tions under which it is willing to accept, from a standpoint
of its own representative mandate, the decisions taken by
private experts (upon bids), and the initiatives and actions
taken by involved and subsidized groups and communi-
ties. This is by no means an easy balance to strike, and
much will depend on the details of the actual arrange-
ment, being consistent, transparent, respectful of interests,
and inclusive to all (possible) stakeholders.
Conclusions
The challenge of sustainability is vital to the prosperity
of humanity and other earth species. To find and imple-
ment policy solutions poses a wicked problem to policy-
makers across the globe. In the age of governance, we
find that governments, private organizations, and private
persons all have a part to play in making the transitions
necessary towards sustainability. Today’s range of regula-
tory instruments and indeed the rise of the regulatory
state reflect the shift to private involvement in the effort
of achieving an effective and legitimate transition.
The province of Overijssel presents us with a fine example
of on the ground involvement of groups and communities
of private persons upon their voluntary willingness to invest
in the collaborate exploration of new avenues of sustainable
action - especially geared to climate and renewable energy
objectives. This contribution took this case as an example of
analyzing and discussing especially the legitimacy aspects of
such interactive policy-making - assuming, for the moment,
that the hopes at effectiveness will be fulfilled.
While applying especially Beetham’s dimensions of
legitimacy, we focused on the issue of support of theinstrument by shared beliefs and by consent. In doing so,
a distinction was made between the element of influencing
on the ground civil network relations (as public-private
voluntarism, through subsidizing certain collaborative sus-
tainability initiatives) and the element of having hierarch-
ical government decisions taken by a ‘private committee’
of experts (as private-public administration). Although the
provincial scheme is susceptible to major critiques on both
elements, we have found that it carries elements that
could provide a proper legitimacy basis. Reasoning both
from the dimension of shared beliefs and of consent, we
traced two normative strands of reasoning: one being
about institutional environments representing patterns of
interaction known as government, market, and civil net-
work and the other being about politico-legal conceptuali-
zations of the liberal state, known as the minimal state,
the welfare state, and the regulatory state. From the rela-
tionship between these normative frames, it became clear
that the Overijssel case presents a typically eclectic ap-
proach, which combines elements of government hier-
archy with civil network involvement, using the private
committee of private experts as ‘go-between.’
We believe that such an arrangement can be success-
ful (and measurable in empirical terms) in achieving le-
gitimacy. Legitimacy is not ex ante given but must be
designed into the arrangement and also upheld by in-
volved parties acting upon a proper understanding of
the role they may and/or shall play. The perspective of
the regulatory state opens many possibilities of regulat-
ing society, but legitimacy of each and every possibility
is not a matter of ‘anything goes.’ On the one hand,
subsidizing voluntary private initiatives requires that
government is optimally transparent on the how and re-
served as to the extent to which it may influence the
public discourse on societal interests, while on the other
hand, there can be no doubt that decisions by the pri-
vate committee of experts may be challenged by admin-
istrative and judicial review against administrative law
principles such as proper preparation, equality and im-
partiality, and fair play.
Further, continuation or adaption of the scheme is, as a
matter of ultimate consent, still well in the hands of demo-
cratically chosen and/or controlled representatives [40]h.
Next, it will be of vital importance that the province
and the private committee are most transparent about
the objectives, procedures, and criteria of the scheme
and the decisions taken under it. For private partici-
pants, individually and collectively, the appeal on their
commitment must be fair but strong. Generally speak-
ing, it is no exception for subsidized projects to not sur-
face. This may not raise budgetary concerns if the
subsidy is not paid out (or only to a minor extent), but
the policy objectives remain unfulfilled. Under Dutch
administrative subsidy law, governments often seek to
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the party subsidized, to legally commit to the proposed
activityi. Given the fact that groups and communities are
social entities with uncertain dynamics, one may wonder if
this is a serious option and whether the voluntaristic
underpinning of collaborative projects is really fostered
by such a formal obligation, also given the sensitivity as
regards government influence on the societal discourse
and the need to ensure that private persons inside and out-
side these projects stay reciprocally involved in the debate.
The legitimacy of public policies, such as in the realm
of sustainability, depends not only on the choice of
proper facilitating and constraining structures but also
on the commitment to fair play and its follow-through.
Not only is the effectiveness of the scheme uncertain,
but the final evaluation of its legitimacy will also remain
a dependent variable until the work is done. As was true
under governance in the minimal state, it seems even
more true under governance in the regulatory stage: le-
gitimacy is never a given standard, it may be designed
into structures and ambitions, but it will still need to be
achieved by proper practice. This is certainly the case in
projects concerning sustainability challenges of which ef-
fective solutions are by no means clear and readily de-
ployable. The Overijssel case should be seen as one of
many interesting cases towards evidence-based effective
and legitimate policy practices.Endnotes
aSee Williamson’s four levels of social analysis: belief
systems as pointed out here would be at level L2 (time
scale 10 to 102).
bThe concept of remediableness assumes that all feas-
ible modes of organization are to some extent flawed
and aims to identify the mode of organization that may
be presumed to be efficient in the absence of any super-
ior alternative capable of being implemented with, by
comparison, net gains.
cPurely on the functioning of these environments, with-
out a particular actual public interest motive, such as im-
proving consumer protection rules (markets), introducing
new legal personalities for private community work (civil
networks), improving procedures of judicial review against
administrative acts (government).
dConsider that under legal theory, freedom is the state
of a ‘bilateral legal toleration,’ combining an ‘absence
of command’ with an ‘absence of prohibition’ (in fact, a
state of ‘regulatory indifference’).
eThe term ‘enjoyed’ underscores that by nature ‘public
rights’ are rights in rem and cannot be privately held
as this suggests a ‘property right’ of a public right and
a possibility to privately change the nature or scope of
such a right. Public rights may however sometimes beenjoyed in rem (against all other persons) - more on
which in the main text.
fA position of ‘disability’.
gRecently, the Dutch central government agreed on
an ‘Energieakkoord’ (Energy Agreement) for Sustainable
Growth, with major societal stakeholders (e.g., employer
organizations, trade unions, environmental NGOs).
hRemember the Hohfeldian difference between rights
following rules of conduct (involving (no) duties versus
(no) claims) and rights following power conferring rules
(involving (no) power versus (no) immunity). The prov-
ince retains its position of power to change or terminate
subsidy rules.
iSee Article 4:36 of the General Administrative Law
Code (in Dutch, Awb - Algemene wet bestuursrecht).
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